Searle: "According to Strong AI, the computer would not only, nello studio della mente, uno strumento; piuttosto, un computer programmato opportunamente è davvero una mente » .
L'intelligenza artificiale nella sua versione "forte", non si limita a considerare il computer come un utile strumento di indagine della mente umana, ma si spinge ad affermare che, con opportuni programmi, esso diviene analogo alla mente umana ed è quindi capace di comprendere e di avere altri stati cognitivi.
Esperimento della stanza cinese.Si immagini di chiudere in una stanza una persona che non conosce una parola di cinese. La persona ha a disposizione due gruppi di fogli: sui fogli del primo si trova una serie di caratteri cinesi, sugli altri fogli ci sono instructions on how to use the same characters. The task assigned to the person in question is to produce sets of Chinese characters (responses), only the following instructions, whenever it receives from outside the Chinese character sets (questions). The key point is that a Chinese experiment to create the questions and read the responses received, the person locked in the room looks like it can understand Chinese, but, in reality, merely manipulating symbols without meaning on the based instruction.
This thought experiment is intended to show that the simple syntactic manipulation of formal symbols does not in itself constitute a semantics, that is no guarantee that the system understands what he is doing. More generally, the experiment poses to our attention the fact that a system that behaves as if mental states do not allow us to be sure that it really possesses these states. In general, for Searle, 'having a mind' means having a conscience, that mental states are not reducible to neurophysiological processes of the brain (which, however, have caused), because they have ontological subjectivity: that conscious states exist, ie, only as experienced by an agent.
In "The intentional stance, Dennett says that" the speed is part of the 'essence' of intelligence. If you can not calculate the relevant parts of the environment changing quickly enough to provide for themselves, it was not pretty smart, however complex it is. "The structure of the human brain has a degree of speed to handle inputs and the output like this: is this feature that determines the behavior of the subject and which governs the intentional activity intelligent. So, Dennett's theory is that what a car should mimic the brain in order to say that it has a mind is not some dark and mysterious causal powers that produce at a higher level mental states, but the right speed of information processing. In Dennett's words: "Consider two different implementations of the same program. In a sense, both implementations have the same capabilities - both 'compute the same function' - but by virtue of nothing but his speed, one of them have causal powers of which the other lacks, "and again:" the relative speed is crucial in allowing that there must be the exact types of sequences of interaction environment - a body. "
still do not know exactly how the brain works,
and this, according to Dennett, is the only real obstacle that separates us from the realization di una macchina pensante. Ciò che Dennett vuole sottolineare è che può essere vero che un computer digitale non potrà mai attivare il programma giusto abbastanza velocemente da riprodurre in tempo reale il funzionamento del cervello, cioè quei poteri causali attraverso cui esso produce il controllo della rapida, intelligente, attività intenzionale. Tuttora non si è ancora riusciti in questo intento e, anzi, nonostante i successi conseguiti si è lontani dall'obiettivo.
Tuttavia, secondo Dennett, questo argomento può anche essere falso: è assurdo scartare l'ipotesi che un giorno l'IA riesca a realizzare un programma del genere, perché in linea teorica non è impossibile. Questa è la vera scommessa AI. The models so far prepared by experts in artificial intelligence for now keep their scientific value: they are useful in studying the essence of the human mind, and are made with a view ultrasemplificazione, just like the models used by other branches of science.
Dennett, "argues that if there is no magic spark or soul, then man is nothing but a machine, and wonders why this man-machine should have the prime position on all other machines as possible with regard to intelligence or having a "mind"
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